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The Curse of Institutional Security:
The Erosion of German Trade Unionism**
Abstract – Among all EU member states, German unions have the widest gap between male 
and female trade union density rates and are least adjusted to the structural changes stemming 
from the rise of the service sector on the labour market. This development asks for a more 
subtle understanding of the role of industrial relations institutions for trade union membership. 
The paper addresses the phenomenon by locating the main problem areas of membership 
erosion, such as weak service sector membership and the ageing of membership in manufac-
turing trade unions. It argues that industrial relations institutions have a double effect. Industry 
unionism is on the one hand a key pillar for centralized bargaining and institutional stability. 
On the other hand, stable institutional structures might have contributed to the membership 
decline.
Die Nachteile institutioneller Stabilität:
Die Erosion der deutschen Gewerkschaften 
Zusammenfassung – Von allen EU Mitgliedstaaten weisen die deutschen Gewerkschaften 
die größte Differenz in den Organisationsgraden von Männern und Frauen auf. Sie sind am 
wenigsten an die Strukturveränderungen des Arbeitsmarktes aufgrund des Entstehens der 
Dienstleistungsökonomie angepasst.  Diese Tatsache erfordert eine gründlichere Analyse der 
Rolle der Institutionen der Arbeitsbeziehungen für die gewerkschaftliche Mitgliederentwick-
lung. Der Beitrag lokalisiert die Hauptprobleme des Mitgliederschwunds der Gewerkschaften 
im Bereich der schwachen Vertretung im Dienstleistungssektor und der Alterung der Mitglie-
der in den Industriegewerkschaften. Er argumentiert, dass die Institutionen der Arbeitsbezie-
hungen einen doppelten Effekt haben. Industriegewerkschaften sind einerseits die wesentliche 
Stütze zentralisierter Tarifverhandlungen und institutioneller Stabilität. Auf der anderen Seite 
gibt es Anzeichen, dass ihre Stabilität auch zu dem Mitgliederschwund beigetragen hat.
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1. Introduction  
Over the last 15 years, German trade unions have experienced a drastic decline in 
membership. During the ten years between 1993 and 2003 they lost 24% of their total 
members. This scope of membership loss was exceeded only by trade unions in a few 
eastern European countries (EIRO 2004). In the developed world, German trade 
unions now belong to the group of countries with the lowest trade unionization. 
Germany also has the highest gap between male and female unionization within Eu-
rope (Table 1). 
This development is not only worrisome for the unions themselves. It can also 
serve as a starting point to broaden our theoretical assumptions on factors determin-
ing union membership and recruitment. In recent years, research has pointed consis-
tently to two factors that largely determine union membership. In cross-country stud-
ies, institutional factors were highlighted. Research studies have particularly estab-
lished the role of the Ghent system, centralized wage bargaining and union representa-
tion at the workplace as crucial factors influencing membership developments (Visser 
2002). Within countries, personal characteristics such as gender, sector and profes-
sional status can explain large shares of membership structures (Schnabel and Wagner 
2007).
However, with a few exceptions (for instance Willman et al. 1993) little research 
has examined the interaction of institutions and organizational characteristics of trade 
union systems. The organizational capacity of trade unions to deal with the changing 
structure of the labour market as a factor on how well unions adapt to a fast de-
industrializing economy has hardly been researched.1 However, the distinct differences 
between countries with regard to their ability to attract and recruit new groups on the 
labour market beg for explanation. 
This paper raises some issues regarding our theoretical understanding of mem-
bership recruitment. It argues that we have to specify more closely which types of 
industrial relations institutions are conducive to trade union membership and how 
they interact with structural changes on the labour market. Its purpose is to address 
these issues by looking at the membership developments of German trade unions in 
general and the metal sector union IG Metall in particular. It aims to tell a twofold 
story that looks at the strong and weak areas of union membership separately. It ar-
gues firstly that German trade unions are composed of specific groups of employees, 
primarily defined in terms of the sectoral composition of union members. The manu-
facturing sectors and their blue collar workers still constitute the backbone of union 
members. Although the service sector is covered by the same industrial relations insti-
tutions and structures, trade union member recruitment has not taken off.
At the same time however, membership composition within the manufacturing 
sector is also undergoing a transformation, as the example of the metal sector union 
IG Metall shows. The union’s membership focuses on an age cohort of workers who 
joined the union in the 1970s. While these workers have aged with the union, the IG 
Metall has found it difficult to adjust to new and younger cohorts on the labour mar-
                                                          
1  See the literature on union revitalization by Frege and Kelly (2003, 2004).
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ket. Recruitment among young, skilled and semi-skilled workers in manufacturing 
sectors is slackening. 
Table 1:  Percentage of union members among employees in EU countries, 2002/2003 
(Source: Schnabel and Wagner 2007. Data from the European Social Survey 
2002/2003 (ESS1e05, released June 17th, 2004))  
Country All Male Female Blue collar White collar 
Austria 3.1 36.2 25.9 31.1 31.2 
Belgium 39.7 42.0 37.4 56.3 35.0 
Denmark 83.6 82.0 85.3 84.6 83.2 
Finland 68.9 63.4 74.4 68.5 69.2 
France 15.6 15.2 16.0 n.a. n.a. 
Germany 21.7 28.6 14.4 26.7 19.8 
Greece 12.4 12.9 11.8 8.6 14.4 
Hungary 13.1 11.0 15.2 10.5 14.8 
Ireland 37.6 43.6 32.3 45.2 35.2 
Italy 18.2 22.9 13.8 17.9 19.2 
Luxembourg 34.8 40.9 27.2 44.6 31.1 
Netherlands 28.6 32.5 24.7 29.9 28.2 
Poland 15.7 13.8 18.3 17.4 14.7 
Portugal 11.1 12.3 10.1 8.6 14.0 
Slovenia 41.2 37.7 44.8 42.9 40.5 
Spain 11.3 12.9 8.9 10.3 12.2 
Sweden 76.8 74.0 79.8 80.0 75.7 
United Kingdom 26.6 26.3 26.8 24.5 27.4 
Note: The samples include all respondents aged 15 to 64 who were employed (and neither self-
employed nor in paid work) at the time of interview. White collar workers are defined following the ILO 
International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO-88) as those with ISCO Nos. < 7000, blue 
collar workers as those with 7000  ISCO  9999. 
The paper argues that one of the reasons for this development could be the model of 
industrial trade unionism that has been highly successful in the past but has not been 
able to adjust to new economic sectors. Within the German industrial relations institu-
tions, employment regulations and trade union policies are still strongly focused on 
the male manual worker in the manufacturing sector. Trade union priorities focus on 
protecting employment interests of core workers in big manufacturing plants and 
recruiting and maintaining members who are core workers in these sectors. Given 
monopoly representation of industrial unionism and institutionalized workplace repre-
sentation, trade unions do not have to actively respond to changing labour market 
structures. As a result, and despite a massive and quick restructuring of the labour 
market over the last 15 years, trade union structures and policies have not adjusted to 
the new economic environment.
For institutional theories of trade union membership recruitment, the implication 
of the German case is that institutional coverage that preserves employers’ support of 
trade unionism at the workplace is the framework in which trade unions consider and 
decide upon priorities with regard to recruitment strategies. The institutions provide 
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the opportunity structure for trade unions to engage in membership recruitment and 
workers’ interest representation. In other words, corporatist industrial relations institu-
tions, which limit competition between unions and secure the representation of inter-
ests at the workplace, have, on the one hand, alleviated trade union worries of active 
membership recruitment. On the other hand, the institutional security the unions have 
enjoyed might have contributed to a neglect of active recruitment of new groups in 
the labour market.
The paper consists of three parts: the first section is a theoretical discussion on 
the role of institutions in trade union membership research. The second section will 
use the German case as an illustration for the theoretical argument. It analyzes 
membership trends in German trade unions, particularly of the IG Metall. The third 
section relates the issue of membership developments to the role of monopoly indus-
try unionism. 
2. Trade union membership in an institutional perspective 
The propensities of individual employees to join unions can be seen from two 
different perspectives. First, the combination of characteristics such as full-time, male, 
manual employment in the manufacturing sector might indicate an individual’s intrin-
sic motivation to join a union because of a strong personal attachment to the labour 
market. It might also indicate that the worker belongs to a social group in which trade 
union membership is seen as a status symbol, as social custom theory suggests (Booth 
1985, Naylor 1990). 2  But from an organizational perspective, such characteristics 
might also point to the fact that trade unions are more likely to attract or retain these 
types of members due to the ease in recruiting based upon their institutional back-
ground.
Following corporatist theory, monopolistic trade union structures foster the in-
corporation of trade unions into policy-making. The theory assumes that a shift of 
regulatory power to trade unions would ensue if the state is able to rely on the co-
operation with trade unions and could expect a co-ordinated wage policy (Streeck 
1981). In exchange, trade unions would expect to receive measures of organizational
security by the state, such as the administration of unemployment benefits as in the 
Scandinavian case, or better access to the workplace by trade unions, as in the Ger-
man case.
In pluralist countries, where the competition between interest associations was 
fierce and governments could not rely on the co-operation of trade unions, these 
measures were not granted or only to a very minor extent. Here, institutionalized 
measures of organizational security tended to be primarily focused on agreements 
between employers and trade unions, for example the closed shop, and much less 
focused on the state. 
In comparative research on union density, institutional factors have long been es-
tablished to be of central importance (Schnabel/Wagner 2007; Visser 2002; Ebbing-
                                                          
2  Social custom theory suggests that complying with a social norm of union membership 
provides a gain in ‘reputation’, which is seen as a private good. See Booth (1985) and 
Naylor (1990).
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haus/Visser 1999; Hassel 1999a). Firstly it is argued that in systems of centralized 
collective bargaining, membership recruitment for trade unions is easier, since they 
can claim that the results of pay bargaining rounds are due to their intervention 
(Bean/Holden 1992: 54). Bean and Holden however, also argue that the generalization 
of wage increases for all employees - not only trade union members - reduces the 
incentive to become a union member, since there will be free-rider effects. Trade un-
ions in decentralized collective bargaining systems are in a worse position to protect 
their members from job losses and trade union competition is higher. In addition, 
Western points out that the employer resistance against trade unions is higher in de-
centralized bargaining systems than in centralized (Western 1995: 186). 
In other studies (Freeman 1990; Ebbinghaus/Visser 1997; Armingeon 1989) one 
finds the same argument using the notion of corporatist bargaining systems.3 Ebbing-
haus and Visser use as a causal hypothesis the resistance of employers against the 
recruitment efforts of trade unions and thereby follow the argument of Richard Free-
man, who particularly emphasizes the role of employers in the United States (Ebbing-
haus/Visser 1997; Freeman 1994). For Armingeon however, corporatist bargaining 
systems are an indicator for the strength of trade unions. The power of trade unions 
is in his view an important incentive to join trade unions, since no employee 
would join an organization if the association can not convince that it will achieve 
its aims (Armingeon 1989: 612). 
In other words: in corporatist settings, both employers and governments have an 
interest in supporting trade union organizations more than in pluralist settings. At the 
same time, they are eager to ensure that these organizations are not threatened by 
possible competition from other trade union organizations. The mutual reinforcement 
of corporatist trade union organizations with monopoly representation and clear 
membership domains and employers and the state serves the interest of all parties 
involved and tends to be stable. The relationship between pluralist trade union organi-
zations and the state was never mutually supportive, while the relationship with the 
employers can turn hostile more easily when the business cycle turns down.
However, one might argue that corporatist stability also potentially faces trade-
offs in terms of union membership recruitment. Centralized organizations that are 
dominated by particular groups and hold monopoly positions on the labour market 
face a different market of unionization than trade unions in a pluralist setting.
First, due to their monopoly position, established trade unions do not have to 
fend off competitors by maintaining a high level of attractiveness for union member-
ship. As long as revenues cover the costs of the organization and union density re-
mains high in key companies, which are decisive for collective bargaining, absolute 
numbers of trade members are of secondary importance.
Second, trade unions might give low priority to new incoming groups on the la-
bour market. Given the established patterns of membership recruitment via workplace 
                                                          
3  See Visser (1989) on the distinction between corporatist and pluralist organization sys-
tems, as well as the numerous comparative studies by Calmfors/Driffil (1988), 
Dell’Aringa (1992), Heady (1970), Schmitter (1981). 
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representation in already unionized plants, they might not aim at attracting minority 
groups, which are more expensive to recruit.
Depending on their internal organizational structure, unions might therefore 
choose to forego membership of specific or occupational-specific interests within the 
organization. Dominance of the manufacturing sector over the service sector might 
deter service sector workers as potential members, dominance of male and manual 
workers over female and non-manual workers might turn-off women from joining. 
From a perspective of the institutional framework of the market for unionization, 
industrial relations institutions provide the set up in which trade union leaders decide 
upon their focus of recruitment strategies. The emphasis by trade union leadership on 
active recruitment and the cost-benefit analysis for attracting groups that are more 
costly to organize is thereby conditioned by the type of institutions these organizations 
are in. 
The implication of this reasoning is that labour market institutions can therefore 
work in both ways. They can stabilize trade union organizations as corporatist theories 
assume. But by providing monopolies, diminishing competition and securing stable 
workplace representation, they can also stop unions from recruiting new groups on 
the labour market, which in the long run might undermine their membership base.
Therefore, we should not expect, as the traditional institutionalist approaches for 
explaining membership patterns suggest, that strong labour market institutions always
produce a positive effect on union membership. The implication of this argument is 
that strong institutions which help trade unions to retain a powerful position in their 
traditional market segment might not help them, or even prevent them from adjusting 
to the changing composition of the labour market. Due to their previous success and 
inertia, strong institutions protecting monopolist positions can therefore contribute to 
the erosion of trade unions. 
3. Membership developments of German trade unions 
For Western Europe as a whole, the turning point in union density rates was 1980, 
when union density reached a peak of 50% of all employees. Since then, union density 
rates have decreased steadily to 35% in the year 2000 (Visser 2002, figure 1). The 
situation in Germany was slightly different. During the 1980s, the German unions 
were among the most stable organizations in Western Europe and the OECD. Ger-
man unions fared well, particularly when compared to the US and the UK, where 
unionism declined under the attacks by the conservative Thatcher government and the 
Reagan administration. The peak of West German trade union membership was in 
1982, at the end of the social-liberal coalition government. Membership decline was 
modest throughout the 1980s and in 1990 membership figures had reached the level 
of the early eighties once again (figure 1).
Figure 1 illustrates that reunification had a strong positive effect on union mem-
bership, both regarding membership levels and density rates. These membership gains 
were however temporary and built on a weak employment basis. As employment in 
eastern Germany declined and unemployment rose, union membership in the eastern 
states declined rapidly. The decline in union members in eastern Germany coincided 
with the beginning of membership losses in the western states. As a consequence, 
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even without membership losses due to reunification, German trade unions would 
have faced a major membership decline, although at a slower pace. Within a decade 
German unions lost about 10 percentage points of union density rate and about a 
quarter of their members. The decrease in members has been steady for almost two 
decades; each year the German unions lose between 2 and 3 percent of their member-
ship.
Figure 1:  Trade union membership and density in Germany, 1958-2002  
(Source: Schröder and Weßels 2003, own calculations) 
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In the western European context, German trade unions have thereby become among 
the weakest in terms of membership (table 1). Only trade unions in Southern Europe 
and France have a lower employee membership. Survey data as shown in table 1 also 
reveal important information about the composition of trade union membership. 
While sectoral patterns are unfortunately not available from survey data or from other 
sources4, marked differences exist between status groups (white and blue collar work-
ers) and gender groups: 
x In no other country is the gender gap in union membership as wide as in Ger-
many. In German trade unions, male union density is double the rate of female 
union density (28% compared to 14%). In eight countries, female union density is 
even higher than male unionization rates.
                                                          
4  With the exception of Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000), who provide membership figures 
(but not union density rates) for the period between 1945 and 1997.
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x White collar density rates are more than a quarter lower than blue collar workers. 
Only Belgium and Luxembourg have a density rate of blue and white collar 
workers that is below the German rate, while at the same time showing better un-
ionization rates overall.
A better understanding of how trade union membership has developed can be gained 
by looking at the growing and shrinking membership segments between member unions 
of the DGB and within individual trade unions. In both cases membership analysis 
highlights the massive problems of German trade unions to adjust to structural 
changes on the labour market. While change has accelerated over the last 15 years, 
membership segments have been stagnant. Unfortunately, enterprise levels of unioni-
zation are not available, nor is there information on the distribution of union mem-
bers across firms and regions. The following analysis is based on membership figures 
that are published by trade unions at the level of industry unions.
3.1  Manufacturing and service sector unionism   
Table 2 shows the distribution of members within the DGB at three different times. It 
presents the current union structure and combines the membership figures of unions 
that have merged. The shift between 1980 and 1994 primarily reflects the impact of 
reunification, when many eastern German public sector employees were added to 
union membership, particularly for the public sector union ver.di and the railway and 
education unions. The share of the major industry unions IGBCE and IG Metall 
thereby declined.
Table 2:  Membership Shares of DGB Trade Unions  
(Source: DGB website, Ebbinghaus 2003, own calculations) 
Trade Union 2005 1994 1980 
IG Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt 5.8 7.2 7.0 
IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie 11 11.2 13.2 
Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft  3.7 3.0 2.2 
IG Metall  35.1 33.1 37.4 
Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss- Gaststätten 3.2 3.3 3.0 
Gewerkschaft der Polizei 2.6 1.9 2.0 
TRANSNET 3.8 4.1 3.0 
ver.di 34.8 36.0 32.0 
Total 100 100 100 
Note: Data on earlier years include those unions that later merged with the union represented. For 
instance, the share of ver.di in 1980 is the sum of members of ÖTV, DGP, IG Medien, HBV and DAG 
as percentage of all members of DAG and DGB. 
Overall, however, table 3 shows how little has changed in the distribution of trade 
union members to sectoral unions, while during the same time the labour market un-
derwent massive deindustrialization. Comparing union membership with employment 
patterns in table 5 reveals that the share of union members in manufacturing declined 
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by less than 4 percentage points over a 25 year period, while employment has declined 
by more than 14 percentage points. Equally, union members in service unions have 
increased by 6 percentage points, while employment increased by 17 percentage 
points.
The problem of union membership in Germany is therefore rooted in the service 
sector, particularly in general services. Specialized professional services such as educa-
tion, police, and railways primarily focused on public services increased their share of 
members. However, the general service sector union ver.di, which should have been 
the rallying point for newly emerging service sector jobs, was not able to attract mem-
bers in these areas, while at the same time manufacturing sectors were pretty stable in 
their membership, as will be discussed in the next section. While both big unions – IG 
Metall and ver.di – were racing for the title of largest German union, structural chan-
ges on the labour market towards the service economy should have turned ver.di into 
the natural winner. However, ver.di has not assumed this role, despite the strong 
corporatist industrial relations institutions in place. The continuing lack of union sup-
port among service employees is the most important aspect of the German union 
membership crisis.
Table 3:  Manufacturing and service sector shares in union membership and   
employment (Source: Union membership, see table 2; employment,   
Statistisches Bundesamt, website)
    2005 1994 1980 
Services Union members 48.1 48.4 42.4 
  Employment 66.4 58.9 49.4 
Manufacturing Union members 46.1 44.4 50.6 
  Employment 31.0 37.8 45.3 
Note: Service sector unions: ver.di, GdP, GEW, NGG, Transnet; manufacturing trade unions: IGBCE, 
IG Metall. The construction sector union, IG BAU, is excluded. 
3.2  The aging of a union – the IG Metall 
This section uses the example of the IG Metall to illustrate how trade union organiza-
tions have become encapsulated in the German industrial relations system and as an 
organization has almost stopped recruiting young members.
While the IG Metall lost members, as have all German unions, the loss was mod-
erate, given the decline of employment in the metal industry. As indicated, by graph 2, 
membership levels of the IG Metall currently stand at approximately the level of the 
mid-1970s, in spite of major structural changes on the labour market. This is partly 
due to mergers with the smaller textile and woodworkers unions which have added 
about a fifth of union members to the IG Metall, and partly to the influx of eastern 
German metal workers in the early 1990s.
But even discounting reunification and trade union mergers, the IG Metall is not 
doing too badly given the fact that employment in the metal sector dropped by 20% 
over the same period of time. While no micro-level data on the union density rate of 
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IG Metall is available,5 one could assume from the data available from the union and 
the employers’ confederation that union density in the metal sector has fallen below 
the level of the 1970s, although not severely.6
Figure 2: Employment, union members and union the metal industry  
(Source: IG Metall, own calculations) 
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The membership problem, however, changes dramatically when taking into account 
the age structure of IG Metall members. Graph 3 illustrates the age structure of the 
IG Metall in 1979 compared to 2002. The age distribution of 1979 is characterized by 
the high degree of political mobilization of apprentices in the late 1970s. Workers 
between the age of 16 and 20 formed the biggest age cohort within the union, 
followed by a group in their mid-forties who likely joined the union in the 1950s. 
Twenty-three years later this cohort is still the largest group within the union and now 
forms the middle-age faction. This age group currently dominates most positions in 
works councils and of union officials. The overall number of union members in this 
cohort has, however, declined by about a third. The age distribution of 2002 com-
pared to 1979 shows how the union membership has aged over time. The 60 to 70 
year age group has increased, while that under the age of 30 has dropped to a third 
compared to the 1979 level. In other words, the IG Metall has stabilized its member-
ship by successfully maintaining a cohort of members who were already members 20-
25 years ago and increasing their union membership tenure. Statistically, longer tenure 
could make up for fewer union entrants. After the mid 1980s, the wave of young 
entrants petered out. 
                                                          
5  The IMF reports a union density rate of IG Metall of 38% without naming the source 
(Fowler 2000).
6  Graph 2 overstates density rates for the IG Metall, since it applies all members of 
the union to the number of employees in the metal sector without discounting retired or 
unemployed members or employees in other sectors such as steel, woodwork and textile 
industries.
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Figure 3: Age distribution of IG Metall members, 1979 and 2002  
(Source: IG Metall, own calculations)
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Figure 4: Entry into IG Metall by age, 1997 and 2003 and apprenticeships  
(Source: IG Metall, Gesamtmetall, own calculations) 
When looking at those who join the IG Metall by age, we see that the largest number 
of new members is still found in the 16 to 20 age group and that it is also only a 
faction of the numbers of the late 1970s. In 1997, 16,000 16-year-olds joined the IG 
Metall, compared to 90,000 in 1979. In the same year, 55,000 new apprentices were 
hired in the metal industry (figure 4). These figures point out the changing age 
Graph 4: Entry into IG Metall by age, 1997 and 2003 and apprenticeships
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structure of the industry as a whole but also the failure of the union to recruit these 
young workers.7
The figures also suggest that there has been a conservation effect of union mem-
bership. A particular type of union activist, who joined the union during a particular 
moment of time, has become the backbone of union membership. As a result, the 
dominant group of members who were educated and familiarized with a certain type 
of trade unionism became the standard norm of West German trade unionism.
4. Union monopolies as barriers to modernization 
The final section focuses on the relationship between union structure and recruitment 
patterns. It aims to link the membership pattern to the theoretical argument made in 
section 2. The section argues that the character of German trade unions as blue collar 
organizations rooted in the manufacturing sector is embedded in legal and institutional 
norms that govern the overall trade union structure. These norms have facilitated a 
closure process of trade unionism that now inhibits the recruitment of new groups.  
The section also points out the effects of recent trade union restructuring. 
4.1  Maintaining membership monopolies 
The re-organization of the German trade union system after World War II rested on 
the principle of industrial trade unionism. Trade unions were organized along industry 
lines, as opposed to occupational groups or political orientations. An employee in 
a particular sector joins one and only one trade union. Competition between trade 
unions was to be avoided. The confederation, DGB, was the umbrella for 17 indus-
trial trade unions which in principle covered the whole of the economy for both blue 
and white collar workers. 
The monopoly was, however, challenged from the beginning. White collar or-
ganizations from the Weimar republic were re-established in the late forties. In 1957 a 
Christian trade union (CGB) was formed in opposition to the 'socialist' leanings of the 
DGB. Civil servants chose to keep their own organization DBB (Deutscher Beamten-
bund). The public sector was thereby characterized by fierce competition between the 
DBB and the public sector union ÖTV (later ver.di). At the same time, civil servants 
have by far the highest union density rates (between 60 and 70%). Here the combina-
tion of two competing trade unions and a favourable environment (job security and 
automatic recognition) has contributed to high membership rates.
In addition to the main confederations DGB, DAG, CGB and DBB, about 130 
small employee organizations developed, which in the late 1980s had a membership of 
about 1 percent of all trade union members.
These smaller organizations did not, however, have a chance to grow. Industrial 
trade unionism was strongly protected by legal and judicial forces from the start. La-
bour courts have protected the DGB affiliated trade unions against external competi-
tors and against internal rivalry by conditioning the ability to conclude collective 
                                                          
7  Micro-level studies show that the vast majority of union members joined the union during 
their first years of employment. Older workers are much more unlikely to join the union 
(Visser 2002).
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agreements on the power resources of the organization in combination with the 
membership domain of a particular trade union. Since small competing organizations 
could not frequently display sufficient power resources, labour courts tended to deny 
them the right to conclude collective agreements. An example is a court ruling of the 
Federal court against the Association of Catholic Housemaids in 1964. Courts would 
grant recognition only in cases where a small group of influential members had sub-
stantial power – as was the case of the steel industry’s Association of Middle Managers 
(Verband der oberen Angestellten der Eisen- und Stahlindustrie) and the Association 
of Doctors, Marburger Bund (mb) (Hassel 1999a).
This legal practice provided a near monopoly of interest representation for the 
DGB trade unions. If a non-DGB trade union took the initiative to conclude an 
agreement – or an employer took the initiative to conclude an agreement with a rather 
weak trade union – the appropriate DGB affiliated trade union took the union to 
court in order to declare the agreement flawed.
German trade unions recruit their members via the institutionalized represent-
tation in the collective bargaining and works council system. They have stable contact 
to employers, clearly defined membership domains and stable recruitment mecha-
nisms in core areas of industry which help reproduce their core membership.
However, this does not apply to all groups on the labour market. The tradition of 
the German industrial trade union is rooted in male manual workers in the manufac-
turing sector. They determined the interest policy of German trade unions and were 
able to protect their position from rivalling groups. Within the evolving mass organi-
zations status specific or occupational specific particular interests could hardly be 
catered to and were generally subsumed under the interest of the semi-skilled and 
skilled blue collar workers.
A monopoly position combined with strong manufacturing recruitment channels 
gave only few incentives to trade unions to recruit minority groups. While manufac-
turing trade unions started membership campaigns for white collar workers during 
the 1980s, these campaigns did not touch the traditional workings of the unions as a 
whole. White collar membership in trade unions only rose during the 1970s, when the 
DGB trade unions were able to get a foot in the public sector door and among white 
collar workers for the first time. This discontinued during the 1980s and 1990s. Ger-
man trade unions were not attractive to white collar workers, and the unions them-
selves found it difficult to establish the traditional patterns of recruitment in the ser-
vice sectors. 
For the unions themselves, which can rely on institutional means to reproduce 
their membership base, active measures to attract new or different groups on the la-
bour market are only weakly developed. Compared to organizing drives in pluralist 
Anglo-Saxon countries, German unions still focus only marginally on membership 
recruitment (Frege and Kelly 2004). 
4.2  The effects of union restructuring 
At the same time, the last two decades have seen a restructuring of German trade 
unions: while on the one hand trade union mergers have further minimized the degree 
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of competition between the DGB trade unions, the DGB monopoly is increasingly 
challenged from outside.
Designed as industry unions, German trade unions within the DGB were tradi-
tionally weak in services. The specific private sector service unions of the DGB, the 
private sector retailing, banking and insurance union (HBV) and the media union (IG 
Medien) were not only among the smallest but also among the poorest of the German 
trade unions. Service sector trade unionism was therefore dominated by the public 
sector and the transport trade union ÖTV, which was accompanied by specialized 
public service unions for education (GEW), postal services (DPG), railways (GdED) 
and police services (GdP). They, moreover, competed with the white collar trade 
union (DAG). Manufacturing trade unions on the other hand were dominated by the 
metal sector trade union IG Metall, which was the largest trade union by far, followed 
by the chemical and pharmaceutical union (IG CPK), the mining union (IG BE) and 
smaller unions for agriculture, leather, textile and woodworks manufacturing (GGLF, 
GL, GHK and GTB). The only mixed service and industry union was the food and 
restaurant union (NGG). 
In the second half of the 1990s, a wave of union mergers fundamentally altered 
the landscape of trade unionism.8 Trade union mergers were used as an instrument to 
maintain absolute membership figures, and thereby steadying revenue for the organi-
sations (Streeck and Visser 1997). Trade union mergers took two forms  First, the 
number of manufacturing unions was reduced to the metal sector union IG Metall, 
which took over the textile workers’ and woodworkers’ unions, and the chemical 
union (IGBCE), which merged with the mining union. Second, a large service sector 
union emerged (ver.di) comprising the white collar union, the public sector union, the 
media, banking and postal workers union. Five small but specialized trade unions 
maintained their organizational independence. During that time, demarcation disputes 
between unions also arose particularly regarding new economic sectors such as IT and 
the environment which did not fall naturally into a membership of one of the unions. 
However, while the big manufacturing unions were able to maintain their overall 
membership share, they did not manage to break into new services sectors that were 
close to their core sectors. 
The mergers and the trend towards super size unions have at the same time led to 
breakaway unions that are now more difficult to control. Doctors, pilots and air traffic 
controllers have set up powerful professional associations that have strong bargaining 
power. The Christian trade union, which is challenged primarily by the manufacturing 
unions in court, has made its way into such weakly organized sectors as some parts of 
the metal sector in Eastern Germany as well as temporary work agencies. Fringe trade 
unions are increasingly recognized by labour courts as independent bargaining units. 
Given the membership decline of the DGB trade unions, the issue of representative-
ness of the DGB vis-à-vis other smaller unions is increasingly questioned in legal con-
flicts. This puts pressure on the DGB unions to take membership recruitment far 
more seriously than in the past. As a consequence, the DGB executive has launched a 
                                                          
8  See Streeck and Visser (1997) and Ebbinghaus and Visser (2000) on trade union mergers.
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general recruitment project in January 2005, which aims to coordinate the recruitment 
efforts at the level of the individual unions.9
5. Conclusion: The curse of institutional security  
The paper points to a gap in the current research on factors impacting trade union 
membership developments. While research has established the importance of institu-
tional factors in cross-country comparisons, it has not dealt with organizational as-
pects of industry unions for membership recruitment. The paper focuses on the role 
of monopoly representation and the institutional security of unions provided by 
workplace representation. It argues that with regard to the transformation of the la-
bour market towards a service economy, institutional security and monopoly represen-
tation of trade unions might turn previous successes into liabilities. Given an institu-
tionally secure environment and little competition, trade union leaders have had few 
incentives to push for systematic organization of new groups in the labour market. 
Trade union mergers, which maintain union monopolies but at the same time broaden 
the membership scope at very low costs, were seen as superior instruments for secur-
ing a steady inflow of membership dues. These strategic choices by trade union lead-
ers can help explain why the recruitment of marginal membership groups (in particu-
lar women) has been neglected, as well as the particularly low levels of female union 
density rates compared with male density.
The evidence this paper provides on the case of Germany can only serve as an 
illustration and should not be seen as an empirical proof for a causal relationship. 
Other countries with strong corporatist industrial relations institutions such as Scan-
dinavia show different membership dynamics. These might, however, be determined 
by other institutional factors such as the Ghent system and differences in the social 
norms of female employment. The stronger occupational status of union membership, 
combined with a higher degree of union competition for white collar workers, might 
also contribute to the explanation of why female unionization rates are higher than 
male rates in Scandinavia. In order to pursue this line of research further, more cross 
country comparative studies are needed to establish a causal relationship between 
organizational structures of unions and their focus on group specific recruitment. 
These should be complemented with case studies to deepen our understanding of 
decision-making processes within trade unions on recruitment strategies.
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